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nefenrla nts-Appel la nts.:

STATEMFNT OF THF NATURF OF THE CASF
Appellants, James Chamhers anrl Stanley Jacohsen,
wen" chan:ied with hurglary,
r·n-1,, Ann.

tel•rny,

~

a second degree felony,

71'-n-2n2 ( 1978 l,

unrler lltah

anrl theft, a second rlegree

unrlPr Utah Corle Ann.

~

7n-ii-404 ( l'l7R).

DISPOSITION IN THF LOWER COURT
After a
H1 irrl .iudici al

Hu1urahll' .I.
-~""'.. "'
t•J

jury trial on March 8 and 9, 1983 in the

nistr ict Court

in and for Summit County,

Dennis Frerlerick, Judge, presiding,

f1iund guilty of hurgli'lry and

the rrt3h State Prison for a

f•,r·m<"r offense and
.,ffpnse,

theft.

the

appellants

Both were sentenced

term of 1-15 years for the

for a term of 1-15 years for the

latter

the sentences to run consecutively.
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tri.11
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t
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1
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('If\'

! 1 ar~

,-Jtl',J

,1r1•i

t·

('l'l ITH'.

~1t-'

Ji(iP(J

ti!('

111

hur<JL1ry (T.

te}f!Visi(Jns,

S'l).

The

,1nrl

infnnnCJnl

then directed the officers to James ChArnhers's residence in
Salt Lake City, which he

ide>ntified as

who had committed the crirne

(T.

59-fiO,

The next night, pursuant

the

home of

the persnn•

110).

tu arran<Jernents rnarle hy

t

informant, Detective Pirraglio, who pnserl as a prospective
huyer, rnet with appellants anrl
informant's apartment
apartment
car,

(T.

the

informant
Refore

fi5-fi7l.

tn examine merchanrlise

in

the

leaving

the

trunk nf ilppellants'

appellants checked for a police car they helieverl w,1s in

the area (T.

fi8).

Appellants then tnok !tetective Pirragli() ,.

the car and showed hini a VCR,
for s2nn ( T.

which he suhsequently purdia.'"''

fi'l-71).

That sarne night,

Richard Thompson returned

Summit Park resirlenc,, 'lnti disrnvered
h u rg 1 a r i zed

a

the

at

pistnl,

(T .

13) .

anrl a pnir

Aninn.J the

rif
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to hi•

it hAd heen

items hP reported rnissin•.;

Tr,ny
h't11

r• 11f ti

r

._,

1

<...;

tir r 1u ;f1 t
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Th"'npsrrn's n,si-1Pnce,
from his

iris'=>iny

h<Jrne

r_in ,Janu,-iry 10,
1,, I Clirirnhers's

---wt•· y t>'><1tc; (T.
1

la1 rd sen,
IT.

JSS,

11 ll) •

JRf;-JR7),

Al

hoots as

trial,

(T.

to

irlentify

it as

the

27).

l'lfl3, nfficers ,with a search warrant,

resirlence and seizerl a pistol anrl a pair
lOR-113) . .larnes <:hambers anrl Stanley

who was staying

1

he was ahle

in the Chambers's home at the time

were hoth present during the search (T.

Richarrl Thompson irlentified the pistol anrl

those stolen frof'l his

residPnce

(T.

2'i-2fi).

Thompson

rlirl not know appellants anrl never gave thef'l permission to
enter his

home or to possess his personal helongings (T.

24-2S).
After a pretrial hearing on February 22,
trial court denierl appellants'
seizerl pursuant

( R.

to the search warrant and

their motion to

irlentity of a confidential

1113-104, 107-lOR),

Roth appellants filed a notice of alihi
The alihi
~stahlish

the whereahouts of appellants during the time period
(T.

l'i0-l'i7, 175-179).

also presented evirlence in an effort to explain

thPir possession of
IT.

(R. 87-RR,

testif'lony presented at trial sought to

lh" crime woulrl have heen committed
«11pPl !ants

the

motion to suppress evidence

require the state to rlisclose the
i nfrirmant

l'lR3,

Jr,7-lSR,

the VCR,

the pistol, and

l'lfi-202).

-3-
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A\IAI LARLE; ALTFRNATIVFLY, THF TRI Al CrlllRT
PROPFRLY flFNIF:fl APPF.LLANT.S' MOTTO'! TO
SUPPRESS THF EVIDFNCF.

Appellants contend that the denial of their prPtri
motion to suppress the evirlence seized pursuant to the sc>arc>
!Jnder Rule

warrant was error.
(1971),

4 of the Utah RulPs of F:virlen ..

in effect at the time of appellants'

objection to the arlmission of evidence

trial, a specif:

is required at trial

even when a pretrial motion to suppress has been made;

anrl tc,.

ahsence of such an objection preclurles appellate review oft'·
admissibility of the challenged evidence.
Utah, fi72

P.2rl 7q, Rl-R2

State v.

Appellants failerl

( 19R3).

Lesley,
to milke a

specific, record objection at trial to the admission of the
evidence whose admissibility they now challenge on appeal.
Based on Lesley,

the

issue therefore has not

for appeal.

Furthermore, "the facts are not

and manifest

injustice would be done

entertain the

been preserve·i
such that

if this Court rloes n0t

issue sua sponte as an excepti0n."

P.2rl at 81-82, qu0ting State v.

g1·1°..it

Lesley,

Pierce, Utah, fi55 P.2rl

r;',·

fi,r;,

677(l'lR2).
If,
issue,

however,

appel lr.intc,'

the Court

rin1u:ri.::int

c;,

,"'trt-_,

-4-
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lt'nl

that

,ir1111~i!

thf_'

1',11fticif"nt,
.,J
t ,

I

0

11riit0d

itL;

r)111nir)n

l \7

( ) '-l ft j ) •

in

supporting

Illinois v.

Tn

reachinq
fcirth

()'-lfi4),anrl Spinelli v.

In ~es,
test"

search warrant

Gates,

hac4. not
ll.

in l\guilar v.

Texas,

Spinelli

anrl

suhstituted

1:ircumstances test"
the

"totality of

the

affidavit

H11wc,ver,
,_-ase

is

its rigid

they argue

like theirs,

lk.;over,

where a

(lCJf>CJ).

"two-prongerl

issuance of a

in

their case,

is sufficient.

apply because

search warrant was

that

They are
not apply to
issued and

the Supreme Court's decision.

cite no authority

in support of

this

ion ..

su'J'lestion that
l y.

search warrant

position that Gates does

the elate of

appellants

Nowhere

n11

is applied

that Gates should not

the

410

Appellants concede that if

test"

the

378 U.S.

"totality of

to have prospective application only.

,,x,-·cuteorl prior to

it

its place.

in support of

court

for determining whether an

traditional

circu1'1stc;nces

,1ppan°ntly taking
cases,

in

the

trial

3CJ3 lJ.S.

informant's tip estahlishes probable cause for
warLant,

103

the

ahandoned

WiiS

yet

s.

its dPcision,

United States,

the Supreme Court

under Aguilar and

the

Suprl=?me Court

Statt=:>s

the st-1nclarih set

ap;1lif'd

JrlR

affidavit

thP

mot ir)n to suppress, which

,-ii 1 )H--' l lnnts'

f-'1l

in

the

the Gates op in ion
ruling

is

to have

is there even a
prospective application

Numernus courts have applied the

: I I•, r 1' ~ i r 1

j

t

h1•

-S-

totality of

the

to Gates.
1239,

1241-1244

(11th

l 11C'1);

('Jr.

l'11de 1 I

'lei\"'

1n

___

r ,-,

I, t

''
l r1 · ~

::-.t
Rose,

Kan.

App.,

Significantly,
125R

( lgR3)

decidPd),

fifi')

P.:?d

this \nurt

llll,

llll-lllS

in StatP v.

(1

t

f

(]llHC\l.

Anrlertnn, 11ti'lh,

r,r;R

P.i''

(an appPal which was penrlinci when GatPs was

did not hesitate

"further support fnr
existed for the

to rely on Gates as

the conclusion

issuanCP of

prnvidinq

that prol>ahlP ceiu''''

the search warrant."

Anrlerton,

668 P.2d at 12SR.
In suro,

there

is nothinq

in Gates or the

relevant

decisions from this cinrl othPr JUrisrlictions to inrlicate th;it
the

totcility nf circumstcinces test shoulrl not

appellants'

case.

Tn the contrary,

that that test properly appli0s
by arpellants,
support

nf

unrlPr

thn.c;e rlecisinns rni'lke

here.

Wi'lS

-

(-,-

cJ~.n

Therefore, as cnncerlc·'

the <,ates analysis,

the search w,1rrant

apply to

the> affidavit

sufficient.

in

P()INT

II
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ll'f'"JT!TY ()f THf: rn'lFTIWNTTAL TNFOR"1ANT;
Al Tf'l<N•\TT'lfl v, F.1\1 !JlRF Tr> REClllTRP
111.c;<1.nc;11pF, WAS HAPMLE<:;S.

Till·'

Till 1\l

('(lllPT

·\[•!'Fl I ·\1'1c;'

Thee trial court cl<0nied appC?llants'
tn require? thEc> statP tn clisclose> thP
confidential
officers

in

informant who supplied
this case.

process of

rlu0

law.

pretrial motion

idPnt i ty of the
inforriation to police

l\ppellants clairi that this denied theri

They rely on language in State v.

Forshee, Tltah, fill P.2rl 1222 (lqRn),

to support

this

cone 1 us inn:
As notecl

in Porshee:

There are two exceptions to the general
privileqP of nondisclosure of an
infonner's identity.
Disclosure is
requirecl ( 1) when the infonner's iclentity
is alreacly known, and (2) when disclosure
is essential "to assure a fair
determination of the issues."
!ill P.2d 124 (footnote oriitted).
tl1P general

rule

That case also recognized

that "an infonner who was a witness to the

crime with which the accuserl was chargerl or who was an actual
r·,fft
t(1

icipant

in

the comriission of

an order of disclosure."

the alleged cririe is suhject

fill P.2d at 1225 (citations

.l\ppel lants rPly most heavily on this
cu1;111r1•1

I'

latter rule,

that thPir rN1uest for rlisclosure shoulrl have been

t 11,--il

ly

t , ik

dr1

A('t iv~'

part

-7-

in

the crime.

However,

the

with which appPllants were charqerl.
burglary anrl
Thorr1pson's

theft ar-1sinr1 out ,,f
an

resirlt>nc~,

witnP-ss or participate

in\:irlent

in;

lhe'/

.../1 t

the· hll-·JLlly
thi:>

v.rt~rr->

infc•rrr1,1nt

n,)t_

)I' l t

participaterl
not

,,.;

i

\'r'R

r1,d

1 ~l

(l Tl ' '
1

tn

a transaction arl'nitterlly witnessed

in hy the

informant.

Thr~refore,

-in-1

disclosure

WdS

required on the grounrl presentPrl hy appellants.
Morf'over,

the

i'1 -1,,11

'11,1

j l ' (]

crimes as a result of their sale qf Th"mpsnn' s
Detective Pirraglio,

·I

idPntity of

the

require disclosure,

i'!S

in Forshee,

informant,
if error,

anrl

it appears appellants

thus the court's failun·

trial marle clPar that

informant knew appPllants anrl that they knf'w him,

that

was at the

informant's apartment, and

that alone,

trial

the

that Pirraglio's meeting with appellant'
that the

informant

the only other person present when the VCR was solrl.

knew the

the

personally marle the arrangPments with appellants f·--r

the sale of the VCR,

obvious.

t

is at hest harmless error.

Detective Pirraglio's tPstimony at

informant

knec-1

the

irlent ity of

the

.vas

Fr nm

informant must hcivrc been

Further support for the conclusion that appellants
informants'

S

iclent ity

is

founrl

at

raqe R7 of

transcript where the following exchanqP

Brown (Chamhers's couns0l) anrl PirralJlin

-R-

is

hetwePn

recnrrlc-d:

thP
~r.

infrirrnant ever

o.
r11d t hr· ('<ir1f i.Jent ial
tPll yc,u f1is n.=:illle?
,;.

Nr,v<'-'r

1\.

r,nl

n.

It 's

A.

That's true

name

1
/

is

t.-il<i

his

rnr->

first

t rue ,

is

p,()h:

o.
You rlirln't
name?
A.
Finally,

his na nP.
1

narne.

it

n nt ,

inquire as

rlirln't at

the time,

that h is

to his

f i rs t

last

no.

it appears appellants rnarle no attempt to subpoena the

informant

for the purpose of

,-ircurnstances,
it was not

testifying.

Thus,

unrler these

if any error were cornrnitted by the trial court,

prejurlicial.

POINT III
UTAH com:: ANN. ~ 7n-6-402(1) (lq78)
ANf'
THP. TRIAL COIJRT' S INSTRllCTION RASEf' ON
THAT STATllTP. ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SOIJND.
Appellants contenrl that lltah Corle Ann.
7fl-n-4n2( 1) ( lq7K), which proviries

that "[pl ossession of

r1rnpe1-ty recently stolen, when no satisfactory exrlanation of
such [><lSsession is marle,
th,H

the person

in possession stole the property,"

llt1•·nnstitutional nn
f

r •

r

•• ,-.: f-'

i- ('

i

c;

shall he rleernerl prirna facie evirlence

i n r1 h i _s

its
1 ( i

fnce

rx•cause

n c; t i t u t i () n '-, l

_q_

is

it renalizes a rlefenrlant

r i qht

t n re rn n i n s i 1 en t

( see

Appellant's Rrief at p.7).

However,

they

ci

t_p

nn

,~1utl~nri

ty

1

support of this position.
It appears thcit RarnPs v. 11n i terl
837 (lq73),

~tcitPs,

4 l)

is dispositive of the issuP raise>d r1y ci1•1wl

There the Court rleterminerl thcit the fol lnwinci
was constitutional:

11. "·
l'1nt

iury instruct

1,

"Possession of recently stolen propPrt;,

if not satisfactorily explained,

is orrlinarily a circumstance

from which you may reasonably draw the infPrence anrl finrl, in
the light of the surrounrling circurnstcinces shown hy the
evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the
property harl been stolen."

The Court held thcit the

traditional common law inference that guilty knowlerlge may he
drawn from the fact of unexpla inecl possession of stolen goods
satisfied clue process standards.
inference

In short, "[s] ince the

. sat is fies the reasoncihle rlouht stanclard, the

most stringent standard the Court has applied in juclging
permissive criminal law inferences,
requirements of clue process."

it sat isfiPs the

Rarnes, 412 U.S. cit R4fi.

The

Court also reaffirmed its prior rulings that thP inferPnCP
does not infringe upon a defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination.
<;;

I

cl.

11nc1er the Rarnes analysis,

76-fi-402, which contains language very similar to that

the

instruction addressec1 in Parnes, does not pencilizP

defendant for exercising his right to remain silPnt anrl
therefore not unconstitutional on its facP.

-in-

nf

il
1

Finnl ly,
hi-'

111nrit '''
l ] 11

r1'

t (J t

the

f\arnes Court

fnirly underst•Jnd
f•S

t j f ':/ •

1 11

41?

as

11.c;.

a

noterl
comment

at P.4fi n.

that the
on

12,

instruction
pPtitioner's

the

citing IJniteri
Accorriingly,

ap1•<>l lnnt
J4S)l,

Chnmhers's argument

which

that Instruction No.

incorporaterl the

languac~e

improrerly commenterl on his failure
merit.

of<:; 7fi-fi-402(1),

to testify

is without

The conclusion of Gainey can logically he extenrlerl to

rlPfeat Chambers's arlrlitional nrgument

that the

instruction

improperly comments on his post-arrest silence.
tn State v. Wiswell, !Jtah f)39 P.2rl 14fi
Ohio, 42fi U.S.
raises

lR (P.

filO

(197fi),

( 1981),

His citations
anrl Doyle v.

are inapposite to the

issue he

here.
POINT IV
TF-IP ,JURY INSTRllCTION THAT POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLEN, WHFN NO
SATISFACTORY RXPLANATION OF SlJCH
POSSESSION IS MADE, SHALL RP DEPMPD PRIMA
FACIE PVIDPNCP THAT THE PERSON IN
POSSPSSION STOLE THE PROPERTY, DID NOT
SHI FT TF-IP RURDPN OF PER.SlJASION TO
APPELLANTS, NOR DID IT CREATE AN
IR RERIJTTA RLF' PRESIJMPTI ON.
Jury Instruct ion No.

lR ( R.

14S)

rearls:

A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorizerl control over the
property nf another with a purpose to
rlerrive him thereof.
y--1\lthnu•jh the

jury instruct ions cnntainerl in the recnrrl
toy nlH'dH-'r, it a11rPars that appellants'

rl0siqn.?1t\-'rl
l 1'tc'r•'rt<'1• tri '',Tury
1r1·

nnt

1 r1<-;t }-lJ,_'t i(1n

d

t

P.

Ir1str11ct inn

14

Nci.

ci.

-1 1-

lR''

is

ref Prence

to

the

Possession of propPrty rt'c•~ntly st<ilt>n,
when nn sat isfcictnry exp1,::in,::::it inn r1f s1i(-h
possession is rn,1rl.e,sh,-:il l hP 1h'1';-"1>fl i11~1111.-1
facie evirlenC'~:" th;::it the lH--'rS 1r1 ir1
1

possess inn st"l" the

Appellants contenrl

this

instrurt i0n rn-",-:itt'S

presumption nf guilt and

(Appellants'
shifting of

V.

Montana,

fi4f,

442 11.s.

P. 2rl Fd1C)

"Lur•l.-11

( l'l7q),

')10

( lC\R2),

their
anrl

sugcjests that the,

instruction impermissihly

burrlen of persuasion.

the one relating to creation of an
were rejPcted by this Court

,-d·lf

Although appellants refPr to

are actually arguing that the

8f>l

ir1-et1t1t t

the burrlen to go forwarrl with evirlence,

Walton, lltah,

shifted the

,-:in

iri[>ennissitily sh1ftt''l ttw

RriPf at p.Cl).

reliance on sanristrom v.
State

prc,pc>t-t y.

This

latter arguPlent

irrebuttable presumption

in State v.

Asay,

IJtah,

(lC)Rl):
WhilP the burrlen of persuasion may not
be shifted to the defenrlant, to suggest
that either the instruction given or the
statute which supports it does so, is to
misconstrue the nature of the statute's
application.
Under the statute, proof of
possession of recently stolen property hy
defendant constitutes only prima facie
evidence of a further Plement of the
alleged offense, i.e., the identity of
rlefendant as the thief.
"Prima facie
evidence" is commonly rlef ined as " [ s I uch
evirlence ilS, in the jurlgment of thP la'w is
sufficient to establish a yiven fact, or
the group or chain of facts constituting
the party's claim or rlepose, anrl whirh if
not rebutterl or contrarlicterl, will rerna1n
sufficient," or m<)rc simply .::i~, n
uSufficiPncy Of (-'VidenCP tr\
jury."
Thus, in thP c:"ls~· ,-'lt

-1 7-

c;nn

q(\

tn

h:1nd,

!ht'

a

f;:Jl

P.7r1

shr,·.vinq l1y the> state>
:1n

11r1c;,1t

that

rlefenrlant

was

in

thP CTUt()fll()hi:e, COUp}Pri with
isfric'trJry F~xr1lcination 0f such

rin~,c;p~.~inn

11f-

l''JSSPc:;si()n, ic; suffirient, without rnore,
t .• d<·f.,cit ,1 r·!.1irn thrit the state failed as
,1 rndt tc'l. r 1f
J,,,, tn est ahl ish defenclant' s
i<kntity ,1s H1» thi•~f.
The stcitute rloes
nrit ()P''--'r,1tP to creat0 a presurnpt ion,
[lf->rrn1ssiv0 nr nthPrwist?, re<Jarding the
credihility "r weight of the evidence sn
CrPciterl; such lies within the province of
the jury.
The instruction aclequately
cnmmuniccites this by pointing out that,
upon finding that defendant had possession
of the ciutnmnhi le, ancl that his
explanation therefor was unsatisfactory,
that the jury may regard defendant as the
guilty person.
We therefore find no error
in the instruct ion as given.
id]

P.2rl cit RF>3-R(;4 •
.Accorclingly,

verhatim (;

Instruction No.

7F>-F>-4n2(1),

the presumpt inn of

dirl

not,

18, which recites

as appellants argue,

violate

innocence which cloaks all criminal

rlefenrlant s or impermissihly shift the

hurclen of persuasion to

"f'P"llants.

POINT V
THE:PF WA.S SIWFICIFNT FVIDFNCF TO SlJPPORT
APPE:LLANTS' CONVICTIONS.
Appellants contend that
,,·;j<J,,nce putting thePl

because there was no direct

in c;ummit County at

the

time of the

···•mmission of thro crime with which

they were chargecl, couplecl

,11th thP

11nrehuttc•d alir·i r>virience

presenti'd at

1 v'l 1 lf'l11_'1

w,==i·:::.

·I.

ir1:=-t1ffi

lt

r1t

t'•

+.d..,,1d . ..; ,,.,.,. ;.,,,,..,.,,_,,,.;;c;;;;ldy
11' 11Jf· r1 Tl(J

(1r1

i nstif f

i 1_~il-'rJ('Y

S\J['i111rt

,cl;.++-<..~
0f

tht::..ir- convictions.
huclcA

ei[

cla

IfTI,

ev id~"nCP

- I 1-

trial,

the
When

persoasiu11@
th is Court h.::is

This Court

wi11 ri11t 1iq 1-1tly 11\'1•tturr1 t)P
finrlings nf ,1 jt1ry.
t\ 1e rnust viPW t f11•
evidence prnperly pr·csented cit t ri i i in
the light rnnst fC1''11r:1:111' t11 th~, Jut'/' s
verdict, anri will nnly interfer•· .v'ic·n the
evidPnce is so lack1ncJ dn1i ]nstir•st,=int inl
that a reasunahle rian coulc1 not pnssildy
have rF>acherl a ver-1 i ct heynn(4 n rr:>a.snna~ 1P
rioubt.
St<ete v. Asay, 11taf-i, G31 P.7d HG!
(lgRl); State v Lariri, rrtah, linli P.2-4 /2q
(lg so); State v. Gorl ick, rrtah, GOS P. )cl
7 I) l ( lg 7 CJ ) ; St ate v • LO<J an , 11 t ah , 5 f; 3 P. 2 d
flll (1977).
Ive also view in a liqht '"ost
favorable to tt1e jury's verdict thnse
facts which can he reasonably inferreri
frori the eviclence presC>nteri tn it.

State v.

McCarclell, !Jtah, i;52

P.2<1 'l42,

q4s

(lg82)

"Circumstantial evidence alone may he cnmpetent
the guilt of the accused."
723,

725

State v.

tn establish

Clayton, IJtah,

li41'

P.7d

(lqR2).

The state presenteri evirience estahlishin<J that
appellants sold Richarcl Thompson's VCR unit
Pirraglio,

anri

that Richarcl Thrnnrson' s

were discovered
those

search of

pistol anrl cowboy tv'"'''

appellant Chambers's home.

~:i

items had heen recently stolen from Thompson's
Although appellilnts presenterl some evic10nce

residence.
attempt
items

in a

to Dectective

to explilin their possession of

(See T.

157-158,
sPriously

evirlencP

was

l1'2-ln7,

?2n-23RI.
AciJTlittPrlly,

permissive presumpti(Hl

lqfl-2n21,

on

in 1·

- 1 4-

th.1t

crnss-f:-'xaniinatinn

prUSPClJtinn

!-~r-nvidcrl

recently st"l•"'

the credibility nt

unrlerrninPrl

the

those

w.=:is
1

in,-

.-'lirlPd

r1y

h-h---lfl/(ll,

tht·
1,.,!l1i(~h

(c;1

~ ~

;l

>lit

tri

l . /

j

,.,·r~

11-'/

1

State v.

Sessions,

·l .+ ,

As noted

in Sessions:

[p]nssrssion nf articles recently stolen,
when co1irlt'rl with cirrumstances
i nrnns istt"nt •,.;i th innncP nee, such as
making a fdlse or improhahle or
unsatisfactory explanation of the
P"c;session, may be sufficient to connect
the ross0c;sor with the nffense of hur<Jlciry
and justify his conviction of it.
SH\ P.2d at 4fi,

quoting State v.

Finally,
alihi

evidenre

insufficient
~1rst,

appellants'

Thomas, 121 lltah fi39,

claim that thcdr unrehutted

further compels a finding

that the evidence was

to support their convictions,

the alibi

evidence

fi41,

is without merit.

in no way conclusively established

that appellants were not or could not have been at Richard
Thr,r'pson's n-'sirlence

in Summit County rluring the period

which the crime occurred

(see T.

r,,nsistF'rl nf

than testimony from appellant

little more

l'in-157,

175-179).

in

It

ch"mber's wif0 and James Wilcox that Chambers spent some time
in th0

hospitcil

'r11r11'-,

.-it

in

the ecirly part of ,"January,

\"1i'J]1'riY'c,

t·,,~;i11Prl\'t~

1n

- 1 5-

l9R:J,

C't-irly .1anuriry.

that

Moreover,

a

jury

is

nnt

rt-•quirr-'>d

t('

testimony even though not contrnrlicte,1 h\' ,,trwr
ev ide nee.

State v.

(1982); State v.

112 ,l\riz.

Polanrl,

~r,ci,

Darrah, 415 P.2rl g14,

41R

r,4'i

.-11t'"

P.

J,1

I lqnR).

consistent with this Court's statement

in State v.

Utah,

trier of

649 P. 2d ql, 97

( lqR2),

that the

ohligaterl to believe the evirlence mnst favorable
defendant

rather than that presented

'H,1,
Th is

1 c:

Howell,

fiict

is ,,,

1

to the

in opposition hy the

state.
Because the evidence ilrlrluced at trial, viewerl
light most favorable

to the verdict,

insubstantial that the
doubt

should he

appellants'

rejected anrl

not

so lacking

jury must have entertained a

that appellants were guilty of

they were chargerl,

was

in t'.~n4

reasnnahle

the offensces with whic 1

insufficiency of evirlence clci-

their convictions affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing,
sentences of the

trial court

RESPr~CTFllLLY

the

jurlgments and the

shoulrl he af firmerl.

submitted this 2___-flt"day of May,
DA\/Ill L. WILKT'IS()'i
Attorney General

=;5-MX- 13 ~-r~n,_
, -- DAVE H. Tfl0'1PS;;vcu
Assistant Att,irnPy r;erwr;l
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Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State v. Chambers. Stanley Ned Jacobsen.
and J. D. <last name unknown), No. 19151
and No. 19152

Dear Mr. Butler:
I have attached a copy of Massachusetts y. Upton, _ _

u.s. __ ,

104

s.ct.

2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), as supplemental

authority that is supportive of the State's argument in Point I
of its brief in State y, Chambers. et al.
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to
Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985).
Sincerely,

=;7(;-CU/-t_

JS.

~~

DAVE B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General

IJP.'I'

iTlfll

Kenneth R. Brown
J. Bruce Savage, Jr.
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v
GEORGE UPTON
-

US-, 80 L Ed 2d 721, 104 S Ct[No. 83-1338]
Decided May 14, 1984

Decision: "Totality of circumstances" held proper standard for determining
probable cause for issuance of search warrant based on information from
informant.
SUMMARY

Evidence discovered through a search conducted pursuant to a warrant,
for which probable cause was established to the satisfaction of the issuing
magistrate on the basis of a police officer's affidavit recounting an informant's tip as to the location of stolen property, led to the conviction of a
defendant on multiple counts of burglary, receiving stolen property, and
related crimes. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed the defendant's convictions, holding that the warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not
satisfy the "two-pronged test" requiring an affiant to reveal an informant's
"basis of knowledge" and to provide facts establishing either the general
"veracity" of the informant or the speci£c "reliability" of his report in the
particular case, and because there was insufficient corroboration of the
informant's tip to make up for the failure to satisfy the two-pronged test.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
In a per curiam opinion expressing the views of BURGER, Ch. J., and WHITE,
BLACKMUN, PowELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CoNNOR, JJ., it was held that the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant is to be applied, not according to the rigid "two-pronged test," but
rather in the light of the "totality of the circumstances" made known to the
issuing magistrate, and that, examined in this light, the police officer's
affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable

cause for the issuance of the warrant

721
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STEVENS, J concurred in the judgment, expressing the view that the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts should have first determined
whether the warrant was valid as a matter of Massachusetts law before
deciding the federal constitutional question.
BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented from the summary disposition of
the case and would have denied the petition for certiorari.
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HEADNOTES
Classified to U.S Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers' Edition

Search and Seizure § 27 - warrant - probable cause - informant's tip
la, lb. The "totality of the circumstances," rather than a fixed and

rigid formula, is the proper standard
for determining probable cause under the Fourth Amendment for the
issuance of a search warrant based
on information from an informant.

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY~ REFERENCES
68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures§ 65
8 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§ 22:126-22:13
7 Federal Procedural Forms, L Ed, Criminal Procedure
§§ 20:497' 20:499
22 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures,
Forms 3, 21, 53
33 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 549, Criminal Law: Need for
Disclosure of Identity of Informant
5 Am Jur Trials 331, Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence
USCS, Constitution, Fourth Amendment
US L Ed Digest, Search and Seizure § 27
L Ed Index to Annas, Affidavits; Informer; Magistrate; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure
ALR Quick Index, Affidavits; Criminal Law; Informers; Magistrate; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure
Federal Quick Index, Affidavits; Criminal Law; Informers;
Magistrates; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure
Auto-Cite.., Any case citation herein can be checked for
form, parallel references, later history and annotation references through the Auto-Cite computer research system .

ANNOTATION REFERENCES
Federal court determination of probable cause for search warrant:
consideration of oral testimony which was, in addition to affidavit, before
officer who issued warrant 24 ALR Fed 107.
Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search
warrant-modem cases. 24 ALR4th 1266.
Sufficiency of affidavit for search warrant based on affiant's belie!,
based in turn on information, investigation, etc., by one whose name lS
not disclosed. 14 ALR2d 605
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Search and Seizure § 27 - warrant - probable cause - deference to magistrate's decision
2a, 2b
Deference should be
granted to a magtstrate's decision to
issue a search warrant, and a reviewing court should merely decide
whether the evidence viewed as a
whole provided a "substantial basis"
for the magistrate's finding of probable cause as required by the Fourth
Amendment, rather than conduct a
de novo probable cause determination.

J

~

' Cl)

'':."{'•
·..:z:

~~
" ...

~

I

Search and Seizure § 27 - warrant - probable cause - informant's tip
3. A police officer's affidavit describing a conversation with an informant provides a substantial basis
for the issuance of a search warrant

80LEd2d

where, though no single piece of
evidence in it is conclusive, the
pieces fit neatly together, and, so
viewed, support the issuing magistrate's determination that there is a
fair probability that contraband or
evidence of crime will be found at
the location described by the informant.

Search and Seizure § 27 - warrant probable cause marginal cases
4. Although in a particular case it
may not be easy to determine when
an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, the resolution of
doubtful or marginal cases in this
area should be largely determined
by the preference to be accorded
warrants

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.
(la, 2a] Last Term, in Illinois v
Gates, 76 L Ed 2d 527, 103 S Ct 2317
<19831, we held that the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is to be applied, not according
to a fixed and rigid formula, but
rather in the light of the "totality of
the circumstances" made known to
the magistrate We also emphasized
that the task of a reviewing court is
not to conduct a de nova determination of probable cause, but only to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue
the warrant In this case, the Supremp Judicial Court of MassachusHt'.
interpreting the probabk
caUSl' re4u1rement of tht' Fourth
Amt->ndm('nt to tht-' llnited State~
('onst1tut10n. continued to rt'ly on

724

the approach set forth in cases such
as Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 12 L
Ed 2d 723, 84 S Ct 1509 (1964), and
Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410,
21 L Ed 2d 637, 89 S Ct 584 (1969J.
Since this approach was rejected in
Gates, we grant the petition for certiorari in this case and reverse the
judgment of the Supreme Judicial
Court.
At noon on September 11, 1980,
Lt. Beland of the Yarmouth Police
Department assisted in the execution of a search warrant for a motel
room reserved by one Richard Kelleher at the Snug Harbor Motel in
West Yarmouth. The search produced several items of identification,
including credit cards, belonging to
two persons whose homes had recentiY been burglarized. Other items
take~ m the burglaries, such as jewelry, silver and gold, were not found
at the motel

MASSACHUSETIS v UPTON
80 L Ed 2d 721
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At 3.20 p. m. on the same day, Lt.
Beland received a call from an unidentified female who told him that
there was "a motor home full of
stolen stuff' parked behind # 5 Jefferson Ave., the home of respondent
George Upton and his mother. She
stated that the stolen items included
jewelry, silver and gold. As set out
in Lt. Beland's affidavit in support of
a search warrant:
"She further stated that George
Upton was going to move the motor h0me any time now because of
the fact that Ricky Kelleher's motel room was raided and that
George Upton had purchased
these stolen items from Ricky Kelleher. This unidentified female
stated that she had seen the stolen
items but refused to identify herself because 'he'll kill me,' referring to George Upton. I then told
this unidentified female that I
knew who she was, giving her the
name of Lynn Alberico, who I had
met on May 16, 1980, at George
Upton's repair shop off Summer
St., in Yarmouthport. She was
identified to me by George Upton
as being his girlfriend, Lynn Alberico. The unidentified female admitted that she was the girl that I
had named, stating that she was
surprised that I knew who she
was She then told me that she'd
broken up with George Upton and
wanted to bum him. She also told
me that she wouldn't give me her
address or phone number but that
she would contact me in the future, if need be." See 390 Mass, at
564 n 2.

Following the phone call, Lt. Beland went to Upton's house to verify
that a moto~ home was parked on
the property. Then, while other officers watched the premisEs, Lt Be-

land prepared the application for a
search warrant, setting out all the
information noted above in an accompanying affidavit. He also attached the police reports on the two
prior burglaries, along with lists of
the stolen property. A magistrate
issued the warrant, and a subsequent search of the motor home prod uced the items described by the
caller and other incriminating evidence. The discovered evidence led
to Upton's conviction on multiple
counts of burglary, receiving stolen
property, and related crimes.
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial
Court, respondent argued that the
search warrant was not supported
by a sufficient showing of "probable
cause" under the Fourth Amendment. With respect to our Gates
opinion, that court said:
"It is not clear that the Gates
opinion has announced a significant change in the appropriate
Fourth Amendment treatment of
applications for search warrants.
Looking at what the Court did on
the facts before it, and rejecting
an expansive view of certain general statements not essential to
the decision, we conclude that the
Gates opinion deals principally
with what corroboration of an informant's tip, not adequate by itself will be sufficient to meet
probable cause standards." 390
Mass, at 568.

Prior to Gates, the Fourth Amendment was understood by many
courts to require strict satisfaction
of a "two-pronged test" whenever an
affidavit supporting the issuance of a
search warrant relies on an informant's tip. It was thought that the
affidavit, first, must establish the
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"basis of knowledge" of the informant-the particular means by
which he came by the information
given in his report; and, second, that
it must provide facts establishing
either the general "veracity" of the
informant or the specific "reliability" of his report in the particular
case. The Massachusetts court apparently viewed Gates as merely
adding a new wrinkle to this twopronged test: where an informant's
veracity and/or basis of knowledge
are not sufficiently clear, substantial
corroboration of the tip may save an
otherwise invalid warrant.
"We do not view the Gates opinion
as decreeing a standardless 'totality of the circumstances' test. The
informant's veracity and the basis
of his knowledge are still important but, where the tip is adequately corroborated, they are not
elements indispensible [sic] to a
finding of probable cause. It seems
that, in a given case, the corroboration may be so strong as to satisfy probable cause in the absence
of any other showing of the informant's 'veracity' and any direct
statement of the 'basis of [his]
knowledge.'" Ibid.
Turning to the facts of this case,
the Massachusetts court reasoned,
first, that the basis of the informant's knowledge was not "forcefully apparent" in the affidavit. Id.,
at 569. Although the caller stated
that she had seen the stolen items
and that they were in the motor
home. she did not specifically state
that she saw them in the motor
home Second, the court concluded
that "[n]one of the common bases for
determining the credibility of an informant or the reliability of her infurmat ion is present here." Ibid The
726
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caller was not a "tried and true"
informant, her statement was not
against penal interest, and she was
not an "ordinary citizen" providing
information as a witness to a crime.
"She was an anonymous informant,
and her unverified assent to the suggestion that she was Lynn Alberico
does not take her out of that category." Id., at 570.
Finally, the court felt that there
was insufficient corroboration of the
informant's tip to make up for its
failure to satisfy the two-pronged
test. The facts that tended to corroborate the informant's story were
that the motor home was where it
was supposed to be, that the caller
knew of the motel raid which took
place only three hours earlier, and
that the caller knew the name of
Upton and his girlfriend. But, much
as the Supreme Court of Illinois did
in the opinion we reviewed in Gates,
supra, the Massachusetts court reasoned that each item of corroborative evidence either related to innocent, nonsuspicious conduct or related to an event that took place in
public. To sustain the warrant, the
court concluded, more substantial
corroboration was needed. The court
therefore held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and reversed respondent's convictions.
[1b] We think that the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts misunderstood our decision in Gates.
We did not merely refine or qualify
the "two-pronged test." We rejected
it as hypertechnical and divorced
from "the factual and practical considerations of everday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians. act." Brinegar v
United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed
1879, 69 S Ct 1302 119491 Our state-
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ment on that score was explicit
"[W]<> conclude that it is wiser to
abandon the 'two-pronged test' established by our decisions in Aguilar
and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm
the totality of the circumstances
analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations." Gates, supra, at 2332, 76 L
Ed 2d 527. This "totality of the circumstances" analysis is more in
keeping with the "practical, common-sense decision" demanded of
the magistrate. Ibid.
We noted in Gates that "the 'twopronged test' has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with undue attention
being focused on isolated issues that
cannot sensibly be divorced from the
other facts presented to the magistrate." Id., at 2330, 76 L Ed 2d 527.
This, we think, is the error of the
Massachusetts court in this case.
The court did not consider Lt. Beland's affidavit in its entirety, giving
significance to each relevant piece of
information and balancing the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability)
attending the tip. Instead, the court
insisted on judging bits and pieces of
information in isolation against the
artificial standards provided by the
two-pronged test.
[2b] The Supreme Judicial Court
also erred in failing to grant any
deference to the decision of the magistrate to issue a warrant. Instead of
• "If the affida"<1ts submitted by police officers are subJected to the type of scrutiny some
courts have deemed appropnate, police might
well resort to warrantless searches, with the
hope of relying on consent or some other
exception to the warrant clause that might
develop at the time of the search In addition,
the possession of a warrant by officers con·
ducting an arrest or search grea!ly reduces

merely deciding whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a
"substantial basis" for the magistrate's finding of probable cause, the
court c-0nducted a de novo probable
cause determination. We rejected
just such after-the-fact, de novo scrutiny in Gates. 103 S Ct, at 2331, 76 L
Ed 2d 527. "A grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants," United States v Ventresca, 380 US 102, 13 L Ed 2d 684,
85 S Ct 741 (19651, is inconsistent
b-Oth with the desire to encourage
use of the warrant process by police
officers and with the recognition
that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is
less severe than otherwise may be
the case. Gates, supra, at 2331 n 10,
76 L Ed 2d 527." A deferential standard of review is appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.
[3] Examined in light of Gates, Lt.
Beland's affidavit provides a substantial basis for the issuance of the
warrant. No single piece of evidence
in it is conclusive. But the pieces fit
neatly together and, so viewed, support the magistrate's determination
that there was "a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of
crime" would be found in Upton's
motor home. Id., at 2332, 76 L Ed 2d
527. The informant claimed to have
seen the stolen goods and gave a
description of them which tallied
the perception of unla.,..ful or intrusive police
conduct, by assuring 'the individual whose
property is searched or seized of the lawful
authority of the executing officer, his need ~
search, and the limits of hJ.S power to search
United States v Chadwick, 433 US l, 8 (53 L
Ed 2d 538. 97 S Ct 2476) t1977J" Gates. supra.
at 2331, 76 L Ed 2d 527
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with the items taken in recent burglaries She knew of the raid on the
motel room-which produced evidence connected to those burglaries
-and that the room had been reserved by Kelleher. She explained
the connection between Kelleher's
motel room and the stolen goods in
Upton's motor home. And she provided a motive both for her attempt
at anonymity-fear of Upton's retaliation-and for furnishing the information-her recent breakup with
Upton and her desire "to burn him."
The Massachusetts court dismissed
Lt. Beland's identification of the
caller as a mere "unconfirmed
guess." 390 Mass, at 569 n 6. But
"probable cause does not demand
the certainty we associate with formal trials." Gates, supra, at 2336, 76
L Ed 2d 527. Lt. Beland noted that
the caller "admitted that she was
the girl I had named, stating that
she was surprised that I knew who
she was." It is of course possible that
the caller merely adopted Lt. Beland's suggestion as "a convenient
cover for her true identity." 390
Mass, at 570. But given the caller's
admission, her obvious knowledge of
who Alberico was and how she was
connected with Upton, and her explanation of her motive in calling,
Lt. Beland's inference appears
stronger than a mere uninformed

80LEd2d

and unconfirmed guess. It is enough
that the inference was a reasonable
one and conformed with the other
pieces of evidence making up the
total showing of probable cause.
(4) In concluding that there was
probable cause for the issuance of
this warrant, the magistrate can
hardly be accused of approving a
mere "hunch" or a bare recital of
legal conclusions. The informant's
story and the surrounding facts possessed an internal coherence that
gave weight to the whole. Accordingly, we conclude that the information contained in Lt. Beland's affidavit provided a sufficient basis for the
"practical, common-sense decision"
of the magistrate. "Although in a
particular case it may not be easy to
determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable
cause, the resolution of doubtful or
marginal cases in this area should
be largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants."
United States v Ventresca, 380 US
102, 109, 13 L Ed 2d 684, 85 S Ct
741 (1965).

The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

SEPARATE OPINION

In my opinion the judgment of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reflects an error of a more
fundamental character than the one

this Court corrects today. It rested
its decision on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution without telling us whether the
warrant was valid as a matter of
Massachusetts law.' It has thereby
increased its own burdens as well as

I. Indeed, that court rather pomtl'dly ret.o consider .,., hetheT the sParch violated

the provisions of Art 14 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights It stated, in part·

Justice Stevens, concurring in the
judgment.

fu~
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ours For when the case returns to
that court, it must then review the
probable cause issue once again and
decide whether or not a violation of
the state constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and
seizures has occurred. If such a vi~
lation did take place, much of that
court's first opinion and all of this
Court's opinion are for naught.' If no
such violation occurred, the second
proceeding in that court could have
been avoided by a ruling w that
effect when the case was there a
year ago.
If the magistrate had violated a
state statute when he issued the
warrant, surely the state supreme
court would have so held and
thereby avoided the necessity of deciding a federal constitutional question. I see no reason why it should
not have followed the same sequence
of analysis when an arguable violation of the state constitution is disclosed by the record. As the Oregon
Supreme Court has stated:

"The proper sequence is w analyze
the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a
federal constitutional claim. This
is required, not for the sake either
of parochialism or of style, but
because the state does not deny
"If we have correctly construed the significance of Illinois v Gates, the Fourth Amendment standards for determining probable
cause to issue a search warrant have not been
made so much less clear and so relaxed as to
compel us to try our hand at a definition of
standards under art 14 If we have misassessed the consequences of the Gates opinion
and 1n fact the Gates standard proves to be
unacceptably shapeless and permissive, this
court may have to define the protections guaranteed to the people against unreasonable
Bf'arches and seizures bv ert 14, and the conSf'"quences of the v1ola t1on of those protect10n~" App to Pet for Cert 31-32
0

any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim
before the court in fact is fully
met by state law." Sterling v
Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d
123, 126 (19831.'
The maintenance of the proper
balance between the respective jurisdictions of state and federal courts is
always a difficult task. In recent
years I have been concerned by what
I have regarded as an encroachment
by this Court inw terriwry that
should be reserved for state judges.
See e. g., Michigan v Long, - - US
- , 77 L Ed 2d 1201, 103 S Ct 3469
(19831 (Stevens, J., dissenting); South
Dakota v Neville, 459 US 553, 74 L
Ed 2d 748, 103 S Ct 916 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Minnesota v
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US
456, 477-489, 66 L Ed 2d 659, 101 S
Ct 715 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent.
ingl; Idaho Department of Employment v Smith, 434 US 100, 103--105,
54 L Ed 2d 324, 98 S Ct 327 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The
maintenance of this balance is, however, a two way street. It is also
important that state judges do not
unnecessarily invite this Court w
undertake review of state court judgments. I believe the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unwisely
and unnecessarily invited just such
2. Cf. South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US
364. 49 L Ed 2d 1000, 96 S Ct 3092 119761
(rev'g 89 SD 25, 228 NW2d 152!, on remand,
247 NW2d.673 09761 (judgment reinstated on
state grounds!; South Dakota v Neville, 459
US 553. 74 L Ed 2d 748, 103 S Ct 916 (19831
(rev'g 312 NW2d 7231, on remand, NW2d
tl984l (judgment reinstated on state
groundsl
3. See also State v Kennedy, 295 Or 260,
666 P2d 1316 (19831, and cases cited therein,
id. at 262. 666 P2d at 1318, Hewitt v SAIF,
294 Or 33. 41-42. 653 P2d 970, 975 \19821
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review in this case. Its judgment in
this regard reflects a misconception
of our constitutional heritage and
the respective jurisdictions of state
and federal courts.
The absence of a Bill of Rights in
the Constitution proposed by the
Federal Constitutional Convention of
1787 was a major objection to the
Convention's proposal. See, e. g., 12
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 438
(Boyd Ed 1958). In defense of the
Convention's plan Alexander Hamilton argued that the enumeration of
certain rights was not only unnecessary, given that such rights had not
been surrendered by the people in
their grant of limited powers to the
federal government, but "would even
be dangerous" on the ground that
enumerating certain rights could
provide a "plausible pretense" for
the government to claim powers not
granted in derogation of the people's
rights. Hamilton, The Federalist No.
84, 573, 574 (Ford Ed 1898). The
latter argument troubled the 1st
Congress during their deliberations
on the Bill of Rights, and their solution became the Ninth Amendment.
See 1 Annals of Congress 439 (1789)
<Remarks of Rep. Madison).
The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." To the
extent that the Bill of Rights is applicable to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the principle embodied in the Ninth Amendment is applicable as well. The
Ninth Amendment, it has been said.
sU!tes but a truism But that truism
goes to the very core of the constitutional rPlationship between t~e indiv1fh1al and governmental authority,
7:10
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and indeed, between sovereigns exerCIBing authority over the individual.
In my view, the court below lost
sight of this truism, and permitted
the enumeration of certain rights in
the Fourth Amendment to disparage
the rights retained by the people of
Massachusetts under Art 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
It is of course not my role to state
what rights Art 14 confers upon the
people of Massachusetts; under our
system of federalism, only Massachusetts can do that. The state court
refused to perform that function,
however, and instead strained to
rest its judgment on federal constitutional grounds.
Whatever protections Art 14 does
confer are surely disparaged when
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refuses to adjudicate their
very existence because of the enumeration of certain rights in the
Constitution of the United States.
The rights conferred by Art 14 may
not only exceed the rights conferred
by the Fourth Amendment as construed by this Court in Gates, but
indeed may exceed the rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment as
construed by the state court. The
dissent followed the approach of the
majority to its logical conclusion,
stating that there "appears to be no
logical basis, and no support in the
case law, for interpreting the term
'cause' in Art 14 differently from the
'probable cause' requirement of the
Fourth Amendment." Pet for Cert
9a. "The right question," however,
"is not whether a state's guarantee
is the same as or broader than its
federal counterpart as interpreted
by the Supreme Court. The right
question is what the state's guarantee means and how it applies to the
case at hand. The answer may turn
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<;>ut the same as it would under federal law. The state law also may be
less protective. In that case the
court must go on to decide the claim
under federal law, assuming it has
been raised " Linde, E PluribusConstitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 Ga L Rev 165, 179 (19841

t

It must be remembered that for
the first century of this nation's history, the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States was
solely a protection for the individual
in relation to federal authorities.
State constitutions protected the liberties of the people of the several
States from abuse by state authorities. The Bill of Rights is now

largely applicable to state authorities and is the ultimate guardian of
individual rights. The States in our
federal system, however, remain the
primary guardian of the liberty of
the people. The Massachusetts court,
I believe, ignored this fundamental
premise of our constitutional system
of government. In doing so, it made
an ill-advised entry into the federal
domain.
Accordingly,
Court's judgment.

concur

in

the

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall dissent from the summary disposition of this case and would deny
the petition for certiorari.
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